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RECENT DECISIONS
mate occurrence of the home."'" Mr. Justice Murphy, dissenting in Gold-
man stated that it was the Court's "duty to see that this historic provision
receives a construction sufficiently liberal and elastic to make it serve the
needs and manners of each succeeding generation. 42 The principles de-
cided in this case will help to insure to the present generation, in a period
of increasing technological advancement, the protection from unauthor-
ized intrusion intended by the Framers of the Fourth Amendment.
Jay Paul Kahle
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-SELF-INCRIMINATION-An accused gambler's
claim of constitutional privilege against self-incrimination provides a
complete defense to federal prosecution for violation of federal tax stat-
utes requiring gamblers to pay excise and occupational taxes.
Marchetti v. United States, 88 S. Ct. 697 (1968).
Grosso v. United States, 88 S. Ct. 709 (1968).
Convictions, in federal district courts, were secured against petitioners
in Marchetti and Grosso for violations of the Federal Gambling Tax
statutes.' The gambling tax statutes constitute a comprehensive system
of congressional enactments designed for both revenue and regulatory
purposes.2 The statutes levy both a fifty dollar occupation tax (evi-
denced by a gambling stamp) on those contemplating the conduct of
gambling enterprises, i.e., those persons in the business of accepting
wagers,' and a ten per cent excise tax on the proceeds of such wagering.'
An obligation to pay either of the taxes cannot be satisfied without filing
a special registration statement (occupation tax) or a return (excise tax)
with the Internal Revenue Service. Both the completed registration state-
ment and return contain extensive information relating to the "taxpayer's"
41. 277 U.S. at 474.
42. 316 U.S. at 138.
1. The general provisions of this tax may be found in INT. REV. CODE of 1954, §§ 4401-23.
Unfortunately, all the pertinent provisions are not collected in one place, but are spread
throughout the Code. As cited in succeeding footnotes, §§ 6107, 6103, 6011, 6653, 6806(c),
7201, 7203, 7262 and 7273(b) must be included to comprehend the terms of the tax more
fully.
2. The wagering tax statutes grew out of the Investigations of Kefauver Crime Com-
mittee of the early 1950's. Debate showed the statutes were designed in part as a revenue-
raising measure. 97 CONG. REC. 6891, 12238 (1951). Some $115 million has been collected
under the wagering tax statutes since 1953. Yet, the amount of revenue produced by the
taxes has decreased from $10.5 million in the first year of collection to $6.6 million in
fiscal 1965, despite original estimates of $400 million a year. See Caplin, The Gambling
Business and Federal Taxes, 8 CRmAE AND DELINQUENCY 371 (1962); McKay, Self-Incrimina-
tion and the New Privacy, 1967 SuP. CT. REV. 193, 222-3.
3. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 4411.
4. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 4401.
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gambling activities. 5 The information obtained as a consequence of the
wagering statutes is readily available to state and federal authorities
charged with enforcing statutes prohibiting gambling.6
Petitioners in Marchetti and Grosso were convicted of wilfully failing
to register for and to pay the special occupational tax, and of conspiracy
to evade payment of such tax. The petitioner in Grosso was also convicted
of wilful failure to pay the excise tax imposed on wagering and conspiracy
to evade payment of the tax. Petitioners contended that compliance
with the federal wagering taxes here involved would require them to in-
criminate themselves, in violation of their privilege against self -incrimina-
tion guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment, in that they would have to
admit to being gamblers-an illegal activity in their home states.7 The
Court of Appeals for the Second and Third Circuit affirmed the convic-
tions of Marchetti and Grosso, respectively.
The Supreme Court of the United States granted certiorari to re-
examine the constitutionality under the Fifth Amendment of the pertinent
provisions of the wagering tax statutes and heard the cases together.' In
what amounts to one decision, Mr. Justice Harlan, speaking for the
majority in a seven to one decision 9 held that persons who properly
5. Sec. 4412 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 requires that those liable to pay
the occupation tax register each year with the director of their internal revenue district,
listing one's name and address, his places of business, and the names and addresses of all
persons who accept wagers from him. The Treasury Regulations provide that the stamp,
evidencing payment of the occupational tax, may not be issued unless the taxpayer submits
both the registration form and tenders the full amount of the tax. Accordingly, the Revenue
Service has refused to accept the $50 tax unless it is accompanied by the completed regis-
tration form, see United States v. Whiting, 311 F.2d 191 (4th Cir. 1962) ; United States v.
Mungiole, 233 F.2d 204 (3d Cir. 1956) ; Combs v. Snyder, 342 U.S. 939 (1952). In regard
to the excise tax, those liable for its payment are required to submit each month an
Internal Revenue form compiled from the daily wagering records of the taxpayer. INT. REv.
CODE of 1954, § 6011. If such return does not accompany the tax payment, the "money is
not accepted." Brief for the United States on Reargument at 39, n.35, Grosso v. United
States, 88 S. Ct. 709 (1968).
6. Sec. 6107 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 requires the internal revenue offices
to provide to prosecuting authorities a listing of these who have paid the occupational
tax. Sec. 6806(c) obliges taxpayers either to post the revenue stamp "conspicuously" in
their principal places of business or to keep it on their persons, and to produce it on demand
of Treasury officials. Although there is no statutory instruction that local prosecuting
offices be provided listings of those who have paid the excise tax, it appears the Revenue
Service has undertaken to tender this information to interested prosecuting authorities.
See INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 6103; Caplin, supra note 2, at 72, 77.
7. The laws in every state except Nevada include broad prohibitions on gambling and
wagering. See PA. STAT. ANN., tit. 18, §§ 4603-07 (1963). In addition to the state statutes,
there are a number of federal statutes also imposing such sanctions. See 88 S. Ct. at 700.
8. In the October 1966 Term of the Supreme Court of the United States the Court agreed
to consider these issues in Costello v. United States, 383 U.S. 942 (1966). Upon Costello's
death, certiorari was granted in the present cases.
9. Mr. Justice Marshall did not take part.
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exercise the privilege against self-incrimination may not be convicted of
failure to comply with any of the wagering tax provisions.' °
The issue before the Court was not whether the wagering tax statutes
were a constitutionally valid tax measure" but whether the registration
methods employed by Congress in federal wagering tax statutes are con-
sistent with the limitations created by the privilege against self-incrimina-
tion.
The Fifth Amendment secures the privilege of refusing to testify, either
orally or by the compelled production of private written communications,
both as to matters which directly incriminate, i.e., to those matters which
create a "real and appreciable" hazard of self-incrimination, 2 and as
to those which may serve as a link in the "chain of evidence" culminating
in conviction."
The wagering tax statutes evidence an elaborate congressional scheme
to compel testimony in aid of state law enforcement, since the statutes
seem 'to be a plan to "tax" out of existence the professional gambler
whom the states could not prosecute out of existence. The essential fea-
ture of this scheme is not the tax itself, but the registration statement or
form which must accompany the payment of the tax. The registration
requirement is directed at persons who had in the past been, or would
in the future be, engaged in gambling activities that are unlawful in most
states. The practical effect of this scheme is to force gamblers to in-
criminate themselves into conviction of state crimes or risk conviction for
the federal crimes of nonpayment of taxes and nonregistration. Moreover,
to influence the gambler to choose the former the state penalties are
generally not as severe as those prescribed in the federal statute for
avoiding the gambling tax."4 By designing the present statute as a tax
10. The conspiracy convictions against the petitioners were also reversed. It should be
noted that Grosso did not, on appeal, raise the privilege against self-incrimination to counts
charging him with failure to pay the occupation tax. However, the Court reversed this
conviction against Grosso also.
11. See Supra note 2. It is an accepted principle that as long as the tax bears some
reasonable relation to revenue raising, it will be upheld and the Court will not concern itself
with Congress' regulatory motives in enacting the tax. McCray v. United States, 195 U.S. 27
(1904) (tax of 10 cents per pound on yellow margerine as compared to 'A cents per
pound on white oleomargerine) ; United States v. Doremus, 249 U.S. 86 (1919) (special
excise tax on dealers in narcotics) ; Sonzinsky v. United States, 300 U.S. 506 (1937) (special
tax on dealers in firearms); U.S. v. Sanchez, 340 U.S. 42 (1950) (special tax on dealers
in marijuana). United States v. Kahriger, 345 U.S. 22 (1953), upheld the wagering
taxes as a valid tax measure since it applied to all persons engaged in such business,
regardless of whether such activity violated local laws.
12. Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591, 599-600 (1896); Rogers v. United States, 340 U.S.
367, 374 (1950).
13. Councilman v. Hitchcock, 140 U.S..547, 564 (1892); Hoffman v. United States, 341
U.S. 479, 486 (1951).
14. One who refuses to pay the wagering taxes could face a fine of $15,000 and five
1967-19681
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measure, an area where federal power is plenary, Congress was able to
place a powerful deterrent on conduct punishable only by the states in
exercise of their police power. Indictments have been brought against
gamblers for violating local gambling statutes with no other evidence
than the required registration forms which accompany payment of the
taxes, and payment of wagering taxes has often been admitted in federal
and state prosecutions for gambling offenses.1" The payment of the taxes,
requiring as it does a declaration of present intent to commence gambling
activities (payment of the occupational tax), or the declaration that one
is already engaged in gambling activities (payment of the excise tax),
obliges the gambler to accuse himself of conspiracy to evade either state
or federal gambling prohibitions.'" Finally, even assuming that the
information elicited by the tax could not directly incriminate the "tax-
payer," it could undoubtedly be used to form a cumulative chain of evi-
dence securing his conviction. State prosecutors are apprised of the
"taxpayer's" places of illegal activity and also of the names and addresses
of everyone who collects wagers from him. With this information, local
officials are in a much better position to enforce state penal sanctions on
gambling.' 7
In these circumstances, Mr. Justice Harlan asserted, it is not rationally
possible to argue that the wagering tax scheme does not involve a "real
and substantial" danger of incrimination to the taxpayer-registrant. The
"setting" in which registration and payment are required includes a
formidable array of federal and state criminal laws, thereby confessions
of taking wagers past, present, or contemplated in the future would be
relevant proof of wrongdoing.' 8
Despite the inherent incriminatory element present in the gambling
tax statutes, two Supreme Court cases, United States v. Kahriger"9 and
Lewis v. United States,20 had held that the gambling tax provisions did
years in prison. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, §§ 7262, 6653, 7201, 7273(b). Pennsylvania specifies
a maximum fine of $500 and/or one year in jail. PA. STAT. ANN., tit. 18, § 4601 (1963).
15. See, e.g., Irving v. California, 347 U.S. 128 (1953); Commonwealth v. Fiorine, 202
Pa. Super. 88 (1963).
16. See Acklen v. State, 196 Tenn. 315, 267 S.W.2d 101 (1954) (defendant was con-
victed of conspiracy to violate a state gambling statute solely on the evidence that he had
purchased a tax stamp).
17. The chain of evidence rule as used in the instant decisions refers only to the pay-
ment of the occupational tax in that payment of such tax would not necessarily establish that
a taxpayer was engaged in a crime, but that does not mean that the tax does not incriminate.
See Mansfield, The Albertson Case: Conflict between the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination
and the Government's Need for Information, 1966 SUP. CT. R v. 103. A few states have
created a statutory presumption that possession of the wagering tax stamp is a violation of
state law. See n.10 at 703 of 88 S. Ct. 697.
18. 88 S. Ct. at 702, 713.
19. 345 U.S. 22 (1953).
20. 348 U.S. 419 (1955) (the conviction of a District of Columbia resident for not
purchasing the $50 stamp was upheld on the basis of Kahriger).
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not incriminate. It should be noted that these opinions concerned solely
the occupational tax provisions. The Court never ruled on the excise
portion prior to the instant cases. The majority opinion in Kahriger first
examined the statutes as a tax measure,2' and then considered the ques-
tion of self-incrimination. The instant Court reconsidered the holding of
Kahriger and Lewis that the privilege may not be appropriately as-
serted by those in petitioners' circumstances, in light of recent Supreme
Court decisions, particularly Albertson v. SACB 2
In Albertson the compelled registration of Communist Party members
in an area "permeated with criminal statutes"2" was forbidden since
Communists are a "highly selective group inherently suspect of criminal
activities. '24 Albertson thereby enunciated the principle that where a
governmental scheme clearly evidences the purpose of gathering informa-
tion from citizens in order to secure their conviction of crime, it contra-
venes the Fifth Amendment privilege. In the instant case the majority
found that the statutory system present in Marchetti and Grosso was of
a kind condemned in Albertson. Therefore, the compelled registration
of gamblers, who like Communists, are a "highly selective group in-
herently suspect of criminal activities" must be forbidden since every
portion of the wagering tax statutes had a "direct and unmistakable
consequence of incrimination."2 After this determination the Court
proceeded to distinguish or reject the premises on which the opinions of
Kahriger and Lewis were based, concluding that Kahriger and Lewis did
not preclude the assertion of the constitutional privilege as a defense to
any action alleging failure to comply with the provisions of the wagering
tax statutes.
The Court in Kahriger first stated that it was doubtful whether peti-
tioner could raise the self-incrimination issue since he had failed to
register, the presumption being that petitioner could have raised this
defense only if he had filed the required registration form with his objec-
tions thereon. This suggestion was based on United States v. Sullivan,26
where the defendant had refused to file an income tax statement claiming
it would incriminate him. The Court there stated, however, that "[i]f
21. See supra note 11.
22. 383 U.S. 70 (1965).
23. Id. at 79. The Court upheld the petitioner's contention that the section of the
Subversive Activities Control Act requiring individual members of the Communist Party
to register with the Justice Department violated the registrant's privilege against self-
incrimination because the information which the registrant would be required to divulge
upon registration could lead to criminal prosecution the Smith Act or the Subversive Activi-
ties Control Act.
24. Id. Moreover, the Court equated the written testimony found in the registra-
tion statement and oral testimony in terms of prohibitions on compulsion. Id. at 78.
25. 88 S. Ct. at 703.
26. 274 U.S. 259 (1927).
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the form of return provided called for answers that the defendant was
privileged from making he could have raised the objection in the return
and left those answers blank, but could not on that account refuse to
make any return at all."27 Mr. Justice Harlan, however, distinguished
Sullivan from the present situation stating that in Sullivan the questions
-in the income tax returns were neutral on their face and directed to the
public at large, whereas in the instant cases the questions contained in the
registration form were directed at a "highly selective group inherently
suspect of criminal activity." Since the Internal Revenue Service is not
allowed to issue a stamp unless all registration forms are submitted, the
petitioners did not, by their failure to asserq the privilege to Treasury
officials at the moment the tax payments were due, irretrievably abandon
their constitutional privilege.28
The only argument seriously advanced by the Kahriger and Lewis
Courts in holding that the registration and occupational tax requirements
did not infringe on the constitutional privilege against self-incrimination
was that compliance with these requirements only indicated that the
registrant was contemplating future gambling activity, and since they be-
lieved that the privilege was only applicable to past and present acts, the
privilege was unavailable. The Kalriger Court in essence emphasized that
the occupational tax registration did not force an applicant to disclose
that he had engaged in illegal gambling in the past, but merely disclosed
an intent to carry on such occupation in the future-the presumption
being that when the gambler is facing charges for actual wagering viola-
tions, then, and only then, would it be appropriate to raise the self-
incrimination issue. Mr. Justice Harlan found this reasoning to be defi-
cient on two grounds. First, a realistic appraisal of the nature of the
tax revealed that substantial hazards of incrimination as to past and
present acts stem from the requirements to register and pay the occupa-
tional tax. Registration forces incrimination both by coercing a con-
fession of conspiracy to carry on such activity, and by eliciting informa-
tion which may form a link in a chain of evidence leading to a conviction
in that "it compels injurious disclosures which may provide or assist in
the collection of evidence admissible in a prosecution of past or present
offenses."29 Second, although acknowledging the fact that there have been
no judicial precedents supporting the privilege's application to prospec-
tive acts, Mr. Justice Harlan believed that holding the privilege to be
entirely inapplicable to prospective acts was an excessively narrow view
of the scope of the constitutional privilege stating "it is not mere time
27. Id. at 263.
28. 88 S. Ct. at 704.
29. Id. See supra notes 15-17. See also McKee, The Fifth Amendment and the Federal
Gambling Tax, 5 Dutx B. J. 86 (1956).
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to which the law must look, but the substantiality of the risks of in-
crimination."3 Moreover, the majority held the reasoning in the Kahriger
and Lewis cases that the occupational tax requirements did not infringe
upon the constitutional privilege because they do not compel self-incrimi-
nation but merely impose upon the gambler the initial choice of whether
he wishes, at the expense of his constitutional privilege, to commence
wagering activities was no longer persuasive. The essence of this implied
waiver concept was the reasoning that even if the required disclosures
might prove to be incriminating, the gambler need not register or pay
the occupational tax since he had the choice of not gambling at all. The
instant Court states, however, that since "[t]he constitutional privilege
was intended to shield the guilty and imprudent as well as the innocent
and farsighted . . . the constitutional privilege is [not] meaningfully
waived merely because those 'inherently suspect of criminal activity'
have been commanded either to cease wagering or to provide information
incriminating to themselves, and have ultimately elected to do neither."31
Finally, even the fragile rationale that admission of plans for future
criminal activity is not incriminating is unavailable where the tax is
on the proceeds already received (excise tax), since the excise tax require-
ments are directed at past and present wagering activities. 2
The instant Court then considered the relevance of the required-records
doctrine, Shapiro v. United States, 3  to the validity under the Fifth
Amendment of the wagering tax provisions and requirements. In essence,
the doctrine states that the constitutional privilege safe-guarding a private
citizen from the compulsory production of incriminating papers does not
extend to records required by administrative regulations to be preserved
and filed in a public office. The three requirements necessary for the
application of the doctrine, as enunciated in Shapiro, are (1) the purpose
of the United States inquiry must be essentially regulatory; (2) the in-
formation is to be obtained by requiring the preservation of records of
a kind which the regulated party has customarily kept; (3) the records
themselves must have assumed public aspects. Where applicable, the
doctrine of Shapiro eliminates the privilege against self-incrimination as
a basis for refusing to disclose records otherwise private, since as a result
30. Id. at 705. The authority for the argument of the Court in Kahriger that the
privilege is entirely inapplicable to prospective acts is apparently the generalization of Dean
Wigmore at 8 J. WIGmoRE, EVIDENCE § 2259(c) (3d ed. 1940). The irrationality of this
assertion is criticized more fully in McKay, supra note 2, at 221.
31. Id. at 704. See Morgan, The Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 34 MINNESOTA L.
REV. 1, 37 (1950).
32. 88 S. Ct. at 713.
33. 335 U.S. 1 (1948). In Shapiro, the Supreme Court interpreted the immunity provi-
sions of the Emergency Price Control Act to confer immunity only upon a witness required
to present evidence covered by the privilege against self-incrimination. The records required
to be kept by OPA regulations were not, the Court held, within the reach of the privilege.
i967-1968]
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of the record-keeping requirement, private records have become public
records. The Shapiro decision permitted Congress to eliminate the
privilege in any area which it could conceivably regulate. 4 The Govern-
ment argued that since the tax statutes in question require that registra-
tion statements and gambling records be kept, they become, according to
the Shapiro decision, sufficiently public to make the privilege altogether
inapplicable. But that was apparently not the basis for the holding in
Kahriger and Lewis, for the Court in these two decisions did not discuss
the doctrine. However, Kahriger and Lewis did appear to permit the re-
quirement of incrimination by payment of taxes and registration for the
conduct of criminal activities, a result inconsistent with Albertson, which,
although not discussing the required-records doctrine, forbade registra-
tion that could be used to incriminate. 5 Mr. Justice Harlan, facing this
inconsistency yet not wishing to re-examine Shapiro in regard to the
constitutional limits of the required-records doctrine, distinguished
Shapiro on the ground that the three requirements necessary for an ap-
plication of Shapiro were not present in the instant cases. The petitioners
were not obliged to keep and preserve registration statements accompany-
ing payment of the occupational tax because these statements were unre-
lated to records they may have maintained about their wagering activities,
and thus were not customarily kept. While this argument cannot be
applied to the excise tax form since pertinent Treasury regulations pro-
vide that replies to the questions on this form are to be compiled from the
daily records of wagering transactions, there are other points of dis-
similarly between this situation and Shapiro which preclude any applica-
tion of the required-records doctrine: Namely, the requirements at issue
in Shapiro were in an essentially "non-criminal and regulatory area of
inquiry" while those here are directed to a "selective group inherently
suspect of criminal activities.""8
Moreover, when Kahriger and Lewis were decided in 1953 and 1955
the "dual sovereignty" rule made uncertain the extent to which the Fifth
Amendment would protect against the disclosures required by the tax,
even if the disclosures were found to be incriminating. The essence of
the rule was that although both state and federal governments are pro-
hibited by their respective constitutions from coercing testimony which
would incriminate under the laws of the particular government, the federal
34. McKay, supra note 2, at 215. In Shapiro the Court listed twenty-six statutes,
covering most of the important regulatory agencies with parallel provisions. See n.4 at
6 of 335 U.S. 1.
35. For an excellent discussion of the Shapiro case and the scope of the required-records
doctrine see Meltzer, Required Records, the McCarran Act and the Privilege Against Self-
Incrimination, 18 U. CHICAGO L. REV. 687 (1951); Note, Required Information and the
Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 65 CoLUm. L. REV. 681 (1965).
36. 88 S. Ct. at 713.
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government was allowed to coerce testimony which would incriminate
only under state law, and the state governments were allowed to coerce
testimony which would incriminate only under federal law. Similarly, the
prosecutors of each government could use testimony coerced by the
other. 7 To whatever extent Kahriger and Lewis were based on the dual-
sovereignty concept, that support was eroded in 1964 by the rulings in
Malloy v. Hogan,38 which applied the Fifth Amendment privilege as a
limitation on the states, and Murphy v. Waterfront Commission,39 which
ended the anomaly of the dual-sovereignty concept.
Having decided that a gambler could invoke the Fifth Amendment as
a defense to prosecution under the statutes in issue, the question now
confronting the Court was whether, since the wagering tax statutory
scheme also has a valid revenue-raising objective, i.e., to reach part of the
substantial sums thought to be expended tax free on wagering, 0 prosecu-
tion to collect the tax in question was permissible. This question stemmed
from a suggestion by the Government that if Kahriger and Lewis were
overruled, the Court should permit the continued enforcement of the
gambling tax provisions by simply forbidding federal disclosure to state
and federal authorities of the information obtained as a consequence of
the compliance with the tax statutes, i.e., confer judicial immunity from
prosecutorial use of the testimony demanded.4' The Court, however, re-
jected the Government's suggestion, reasoning that since both the statutes
and practices under it clearly indicated a congressional purpose that the
information obtained as a consequence of the payment of the wagering
taxes be provided to interested prosecuting authorities, to impose use-
restrictions would preclude effectuation of congressional purpose.42 Addi-
37. See United States v. Murdock, 284 U.S. 141 (1931); Feldman v. United States, 322
U.S. 487 (1944); Knapp v. Schweitzer, 357 U.S. 371 (1958).
38. 378 U.S. 1 (1964).
39. 378 U.S. 52 (1964).
40. Mr. Chief Justice Warren, in a dissenting opinion, quoted the President's Com-
mission on Law Enforcement's 1967 task force report as estimating the annual gambling
of organized crime as $7 billion to $50 billion. 88 S. Ct. at 719.
41. The Government's suggestion was based on a similar immunization of petitioner
from federal prosecution in Murphy v. Waterfront Commission, 378 U.S. 52 (1964).
Murphy held that where a state grants a witness a valid immunity from prosecution, he
may be compelled to testify in state proceedings. However, the federal government is not
permitted to make use of such testimony, or the fruits thereof, in a federal prosecution.
Further, if a witness is granted a valid immunity from prosecution, he may be compelled
to testify, as the reason for asserting the privilege no longer exists. Once immunity is
granted and the witness refuses to testify, he may be held in contempt. Brown v. Walker,
161 U.S. 591 (1896).
42. The Court emphasized that it would not suffice to sever those provisions of the
statute which authorize the Internal Revenue Service to make available to prosecuting
officers the information obtained as a result of the wagering statutes. 88 S. Ct. at 708 n.18.
1967-1968]
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tionally the Court reasoned that the imposition of such restrictions
would oblige prosecuting authorities to establish in each case that their
evidence was untainted by any connection with the information obtained
as a consequence of the wagering taxes, the result being that the federal
interest in tax revenue could not be protected without hampering the
enforcement of state prohibitions against gambling. Consequently the
Court stated that "[w]e cannot know how Congress would assess the
competing demands of the federal treasury and of state gambling prohi-
bitions . . . the Constitution has entrusted to Congress, and not to this
Court, the task of striking an appropriate balance among such values. 4 3
If the majority had concluded the opinion with the above statement
it is submitted that Mr. Chief Justice Warren's argument in the dissent-
ing opinion that the decision was "unnecessarily sweeping" would have
merit." The majority, however, in view of the importance of the regula-
tory and revenue purposes of the tax statutes, emphasized that it is only
under the wagering tax system as presently written that those who prop-
erly assert the constitutional privilege to these provisions may not be
criminally punished for failure to comply with their requirements.
"[N]othing we do today will prevent either the taxation or the regulation
by Congress of activities otherwise made unlawful by state or federal stat-
utes" (emphasis added)." It is submitted that the Court seems to imply
that if subsequent legislation which would be compatible with the Fifth
Amendment were attached to the wagering tax statutes, i.e., if the provi-
sions of the statute were re-drafted so as to provide complete protection
from all prosecutions to which the required information is directly or in-
directly related, such legislation would overcome any self-incrimination
claim. In effect, an immunity provision should be attached to the present
statutes if Congress determines that the federal interest in tax revenue
is paramount."'
See supra note 6. In a dissenting opinion, Mr. Chief Justice Warren stated that the Court had
the power to sever these provisions. Id. at 720-21.
43. 88 S. Ct. at 708.
44. Id. at 721. The crux of Mr. Chief Justice Warren's argument is that the Court
should have conferred judicial immunity on the testimony demanded. However, it is sub-
mitted that it is doubtful whether the Court could have imposed judicial immunity in this
situation. Judicially conferred immunity operates only where a person entitled to the
privilege makes disclosures over his objection. But without an immunity statute or a
grant of immunity a judge cannot order oral statements or production of written com-
munications that are exempted by the privilege. McKay, supra note 2, at 232. In Murphy,
the Court imposed judicial immunity where there had been an existing grant of immunity
by the state.
45. Id. at 709.
46. There are now more than forty immunity statutes and a substantial number of state
immunity statutes. For a listing of the federal statutes see Note, The Federal Witness Im-
munity Acts in Theory and Practice: Treading the Constitutional Tightrope, 72 YALE L.J.
1568, 1611-12 (1963). To be valid, the immunity statute must be co-extensive with the
[Vol. 6:291
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By these decisions, the Court has indicated that all registrations,
whether or not attached to special tax provisions,"7 will be rendered in-
effective by a proper assertion of the privilege against self-incrimination
if the practice under them clearly furthers a congressional purpose to
gather evidence from citizens in order to secure their conviction of crime."8
If subsequent legislation, in the form of immunity provisions, are
attached to such registration statutes the vitality of the statutes as
regulatory measures will be preserved while precluding from prosecutorial
use the information obtained as a result of such registration.
The privilege against self-incrimination, moreover, has undergone a
significant re-examination in the instant cases. The Supreme Court has,
by its present decisions, provided further clarification of the constitu-
tional doctrine surrounding the privilege against self-incrimination by its
elimination of the ambiguities and inconsistencies found between the
principles enunciated in Kahriger and Lewis, and those expounded in the
recent decisions of Malloy, Murphy, and Albertson. The Court has indi-
cated that if the privilege is to have any real meaning, it should apply to
defeat any legislative scheme of incrimination by required confession.
Thus, where as here, one of the prime purposes and effects of federal
enactments was to bring to the attention of prosecutors, violations of
state law, such statutes clearly infringe on the personal rights of the
citizen guaranteed by the Constitution, and the self-incrimination
privilege will afford that citizen protection. While the decisions necessarily
defeat any congressional objective to aid state and federal officials in
the prosecution of those who violate local gambling prohibition enact-
ments, the decisions do leave the door open for the government to secure
at least payment of the tax and completion of the registration forms.
The decisions do not render ineffective the required-records doctrine or
statutes, but only modify slightly the doctrine in that the decisions per-
privilege it displaces, i.e., it must preclude prosecution for any offense related to the testi-
mony. Council v. Hitchcock, 140 U.S. 547, 585-86 (1892). Where the statute does not offer
this protection, the witness is not compelled to give testimony over his objection. Cf. Albert-
son v. SACB, 382 U.S. 70 (1965).
47. Registration of those liable for special taxes is a common and integral feature of the
tax laws. See INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 7011. For example, the following provisions impose
occupational taxes and subjects the taxpayer to the registration requirements of § 7011:
§§ 4721 and 4702(a) (2) (C) (those who deal in narcotic drugs); § 4751 (dealers in mari-
juana; § 5101 (manufacturers of stills) ; § 5801 (dealers in certain firearms). The registra-
tion requirements apply uniformly to those engaged in such occupation lawfully and those
whose activities would make them liable for criminal prosecution. There are also many
other federal registration statutes besides the tax statutes.
48. The very day Marchetti and Grosso were decided, the Court, adhering to its de-
cisions in these two cases, ruled that petitioner's claim of the constitutional privilege against
self-incrimination provided a complete defense to prosecutions either for failure to register
firearms under § 5841 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 or possession of unregistered
firearms under § 5851. Haynes v. U.S., 88 S. Ct. 722 (1968).
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mit restoration of the privilege to records normally private, except for the
record-keeping requirement, without limiting the power of the govern-
ment to secure information necessary for its effective operation. As one
commentator suggests, extension of the required-records doctrine to an
area "permeated with criminal statutes" would invite complete nullifica-
tion of the privilege by a network of registration statutes. 9
Donald J. Burns
EMINENT DOMAIN-RIPARIAN RIGHTs-The Supreme Court reaffirms its
decision in United States v. Twin City Power Co., 350 U.S. 222 (1956)
and holds that the government may disregard the value of land arising
from the fact of riparian location in compensating the owner when fast
lands are appropriated.
United States v. Rands, 88 S. Ct. 265 (1967).
In United States v. Rands1 the owner of riparian land on the Columbia
River in Oregon had leased his land to the State, with an option to buy.
The land was to be used as an industrial park, and part of it was to be
used as a port. The United States Government, however, condemned the
land and reconveyed it to Oregon at a price much lower than that of the
option price for which the owner had expected to sell. The value of the
land determined by the judge in the condemnation proceeding was limited
to its value for sand, gravel, and agricultural purposes. Its special value
as a port site was not taken into consideration, and consequently the
owner received about one-fifth of the claimed value of the land as a port
site.
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the decision,2 con-
cluding that port site value was an element of "just compensation" under
the Fifth Amendment, and the Supreme Court granted certiorari.8
The Court, apparently desiring to dispel any possibility of future
doubts and ambiguities in the lower courts' decisions on this question,
emphatically reaffirmed the controversial United States v. Twin City
Power Co.,' which held that the United States Government, when appro-
priating lands riparian to a navigable stream for use as a power site, does
not have to compensate the owner for the added value of his land which
inures to it due to the flow of the stream. Although asked to distinguish
between the added Value of land when condemned for use as a power site,
49. McKay, supra note 2, at 222.
1. United States v. Rands, 88 S. Ct. 265 (1967).
2. United States v. Rands, 367 F.2d 186 (9th Cir. 1966).
3. 88 S. Ct. 265 (1967).
4. United States v. Twin City Power Co., 350 U.S. 222 (1956).
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